Ivanti’s Desktop & Server Management (DSM) product is an old acquaintance that we have encountered in numerous red team and internal assessments. The main purpose of the product is the centralized distribution of software packages. In our blog post Analyzing the Attack Surface of Ivanti’s DSM we take a look at the software from an attacker’s perspective. We discuss common misconfigurations, uncover the technical details of two vulnerabilities we identified and provide recommendations to harden existing DSM environments.

This blog post provides insights into three exploitation techniques that can still be used in cases of a hardened .NET Remoting server with TypeFilterLevel.Low and Code Access Security (CAS) restrictions in place. Two of these tricks are considered novel and can help in cases where ExploitRemotingService is stuck.

How leaking valid ObjRefs to target .NET Remoting for Remote Code Execution is not considered a vulnerability – at least according to Microsoft.

In Part I, we dug into the internals of the ASP.NET TemplateParser and elaborated its capabilities in respect to exploitation. In this part, we will look into whether and how this can also be exploited to gain Remote Code Execution. While this research was originally focussed on the TemplateParser, the newly discovered technique was also applicable to SharePoint on-premises and SharePoint Online. So we’ll elaborate on how SharePoint protects against the use of malicious code and will present a novel trick that allowed to bypass these security measures (CVE-2023-33160).

The TemplateParser is fundamental in ASP.NET Web Forms. It is used for parsing different ASP.NET source files such as *.aspx and for parsing other input from various sources, including user provided data. In this two part series we will take a deep look into TemplateParser internals, its capabilities, and how they can be exploited. This knowledge is then applied in the field to demonstrate Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in Sitecore (CVE-2023-35813) and SharePoint (CVE-2023-33160).

The Linux audit framework provides a powerful audit system for monitoring security relevant events on Linux operating systems. In this blogpost, we demonstrate some attacks on its userspace component auditd with the goal to tamper with audit events to hide malicious activity. We also released two PoCs called daphne and apollon that demonstrate different techniques to tamper with audit events. Background Over the last couple of years, monitoring and endpoint protection solutions have developed rapidly.

This is a story on discovering an Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in a CRM product by the vendor ACT!. What made this story special for us was that we had to take a blackbox approach at the beginning and the system was not exploitable with standard .NET Remoting payloads due to several reasons we’ll explain in this blog post.

Java deserialization gadgets have a long history in context of vulnerability research and at least go back to the year 2015. One of the most popular tools providing a large set of different gadgets is ysoserial by Chris Frohoff. Recently, we observed increasing concerns from the community why several gadgets do not seem to work anymore with more recent versions of JDKs. In this blog post we try to summarize certain facts to reenable some capabilities which seemed to be broken. But our journey did not begin with deserialization in the first place but rather looking for alternative ways of executing Java code in recent JDK versions. In this blost post, we will focus on OpenJDK and Oracle implementations. Defenders should therefore adjust their search patterns to these alternative code execution patterns accordingly.

The Java Management Extensions (JMX) are used by many if not all enterprise level applications in Java for managing and monitoring of application settings and metrics. While exploiting an accessible JMX endpoint is well known and there are several free tools available, this blog post will present new insights and a novel exploitation technique that allows for instant Remote Code Execution with no further requirements, such as outgoing connections or the existence of application specific MBeans.

In this blogpost we demonstrate an attack on the integrity of Sysmon which generates a minimal amount of observable events making this attack difficult to detect in environments where no additional security products are installed.